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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MOTIVATED REASONING, POST-TRUTH, AND ELECTION LAW
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES*
In his Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at St. Louis University School
of Law, entitled Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law
in a “Post-Truth” World, Professor Richard Hasen argues that “some of today’s
most urgent election law questions seem fundamentally different and less Courtcentric than those of the past.” 1 This is because, he maintains, we now live in a
“post-truth era,” abetted by “rapid technological change” and hyperpolarization,
which has made it hard for voters to “separate truth from falsity.” 2 In his view,
campaigns now “increasingly take place under conditions of voter mistrust and
groupthink, with the potential for foreign interference and domestic political
manipulation via new and increasingly sophisticated technological tools.” 3
Voters are only exposed to information from people on their side, which they
tend to believe, and discount information from the other side, which they
distrust. 4
Professor Hasen contends that election law’s court-centricity leaves election
law ill-equipped to address these problems, which are fundamentally different
from the ones that have preoccupied the field. 5 For example, in the past, the field
has been concerned with the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, the
constitutionality of campaign finance regulation, or the constitutionality of
photographic voter identification requirements. 6 The current issues in the field,
Professor Hasen argues, center around social media and technological
innovations such as deep fakes and bots. 7 As a consequence of technological
innovations in our social media landscape, coupled with polarization, voters
have an increasingly difficult time of separating true information from false
information. This problem is made worse when political actors deliberately

* Edward & Ellen Schwarzman Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks to Luis FuentesRohwer, Justin Levitt and Franita Tolson for thoughtful feedback.
1. Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a
“Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 536 (2020).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 537.
4. Id. at 537–38.
5. Id. at 537.
6. Hasen, supra note 1, at 535–36.
7. Id. at 536.
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disseminate false information into the political marketplace. The field’s courtcentricity makes election law particularly ill-equipped to address these two
problems because polarization, which has infected American electoral
institutions, particularly Congress, has also affected the Supreme Court. 8
Professor Hasen observes, “polarization has changed everything on the Supreme
Court.” 9 As he sees it, the problem of polarization is exacerbated by where the
Justices receive their news sources. 10 Just as the rest of our society is
“experiencing rapid technological change in which social media amplifies and
reinforces existing ideas, and where people get exposed to information from
increasingly siloed sources,” the Court is as well. 11 “The Justices are not going
to be immune from this phenomenon.” 12 He thus asks, whether “we [can] expect
judges to evaluate contested voting rights claims when they, like others, may
live in information cocoons in which the one-sided media they consume affects
their factual priors.” 13 Facts will matter increasingly less to the judges and the
Justices just as facts matter less to the rest of society. 14
In sum, Professor Hasen makes two claims. The first claim is that we are
dealing with different types of election law problems today than the ones that
we have dealt with in the past. Unlike the election law issues of the past, we live
in a post-truth world and though we use to agree on basic facts about our world,
we no longer do so. That is his major premise. His minor premise is that we will
have a hard time resolving modern election law issues because election law
relies on courts, in particular, the Supreme Court, to resolve election law
disputes. Election law is too court-centric. This court-centricity he argues, is a
problem because courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are similarly afflicted
by the post-truth environment, just like the rest of society. Consequently, they
cannot objectively analyze the issues and provide solutions to modern-day
problems. His preferred solution is to change campaign finance laws. However,
he believes that solution is unlikely to be implemented because the Justices on
the Court, who live in a post-truth world, will probably not allow it.
Professor Hasen addresses some important issues in his paper and in his
lecture. Specifically, his focus on deliberate misinformation and falsehoods in
electoral campaigns points us to a truly challenging and difficult problem. And
his argument that campaign finance regulation can only ignore the internet at its
peril is a point that must be considered. But I don’t think Professor Hasen has
accurately diagnosed the problem. Professor Hasen’s important point about
misinformation is obscured by an unnecessary and conceptually inaccurate
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Hasen, supra note 1, at 565.
Id.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 566.
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framing, post-truth. I disagree with his central claim that we live in a post-truth
world. As I will show, the problem that he describes is not post-truth but
motivated reasoning.
Second, I disagree with Professor Hasen that contemporary election law
issues, as least as he describes them, are difficult to solve because our tools are
too court-centric. I agree with Professor Hasen that misinformation, deep fakes,
and bots are a challenge to our commitment to making electoral decisions on the
basis of accurate facts and empirical realities, but courts have been addressing
the problems of lying and misinformation in election law for a long time. I don’t
view these challenges as categorically different from the election law problems
of the past. I think Professor Hasen misses the boat when he argues that courtcentricity is the reason that modern campaign finance law, in particular, and
election law more broadly, cannot address lying and misinformation in
democratic politics. Moreover, some issues, such as the fact that campaign
finance law has declared the internet a de-regulatory zone has nothing to do with
court-centricity. Congress can address that problem. It is not new, nor does it
depend upon courts to resolve.
Part I of this short commentary takes issue with the post-truth framing. It
argues that the problem Professor Hasen identifies is not the grandiose-sounding
post-truth but partisan motivated reasoning. Part II questions whether deep fakes
and bots present different challenges to truth and accurate information than the
ones that courts routinely address. It argues court-centricity does not put election
law at a particularly distinctive disadvantage in addressing these issues. Or more
precisely, the Court is not any more or less disadvantaged in addressing the
challenge posed by deep fakes or bots than it is to the challenge posed by partisan
gerrymandering or malapportionment. I commend Professor Hasen for focusing
on some important questions—misinformation, deliberate misinformation by
candidates, deliberate misinformation by supporters, foreign interference in
elections, distrust in election outcomes, the integrity of voting machines.
However, I think that the attempt to link all that currently ails election law as
emanating from a singular phenomenon, post-truth, and a function of the
purported court-centricity in election law, is unhelpful to addressing different
events, with potentially different causal mechanisms, and different solutions.
DIAGNOSIS AND MISDIAGNOSIS: POST-TRUTH OR PARTISAN MOTIVATED
REASONING?
In order to assess whether Professor Hasen has accurately identified the
problem, we first need conceptual clarity on one of his key claims. Professor
Hasen’s animating claim is that that we live in a post-truth world. 15 I argue in
this part that this post-truth claim is not just unnecessarily sensationalist, but

15. Id. at 537.
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more importantly, it is analytically unhelpful. It is hard to understand what
Professor Hasen means by post-truth, but based upon the examples that he
provides, Professor Hasen seems to mean that we live in a political environment
where voters filter public policy issues through their partisan identities and they
decide what to believe on salient public policy questions from the partisan
political elites who share the voters’ political identities. This is not post-truth; it
is partisan motivated reasoning for which there is a long and rich literature.
To evaluate Professor Hasen’s argument, we need to first understand what
he means by post-truth. One obvious answer is that post-truth means the absence
of objective truth. That is, we live in a world in which there is no objective truth.
Professor Hasen forswears that definition. “I do not mean,” he writes, that “there
is no such thing as objective truth.” 16 Another possible definition could be that
there is objective truth, but our society behaves as if there is not. This seems to
be closer to what Professor Hasen has in mind. Post-truth, according to Professor
Hasen, refers to a world in which there are “fundamental disagreement[s] among
members of the public regarding basic facts about the state of the world, and
there is no generally accepted arbiter whom a broad spectrum of the public will
rely upon to resolve public factual disputes.” 17 Put differently, there are
objective basic facts, but we disagree about them, and there is no authority figure
with the epistemic authority to resolve our factual disputes.
If this is what Professor Hasen means, he does not provide any support for
it. There are lots of matters that Americans agree on from the trivial and
mundane to the serious and profound. For example, Americans by and large
agree that the Toronto Raptors were the champions of the National Basketball
Association in 2019, even though some Americans would have wished it
otherwise. More seriously, Americans by and large respect the fact that samesex marriage is the law of the land, even though some Americans may object on
moral or religious grounds. I don’t read Professor Hasen as arguing that there
once was a time where we agreed on basic facts, like whether African Americans
are humans worthy of dignity and equality or whether women are equal to men
or whether a Catholic ought to be President of the United States, but today we
disagree on those basic facts. That claim is too broad to be taken seriously. Either
we have always lived in a post-truth world, as defined by Professor Hasen, or
we have never lived in a post-truth world, as defined by Professor Hasen. By his
definition, post-truth means that we no longer agree about the fundamental facts
of our world, and this claim strikes me as much too broad to do any real work.
Though Professor Hasen’s definition seems too capacious to do the type of
analytical work that would enable us to figure out whether we live in a post-truth
world or not, he usefully provides a few examples to illustrate what he means by
his nomenclature post-truth. The first example addresses partisan differences on
16. Hasen, supra note 1, at 537.
17. Id.
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climate change. 18 Democrats tend to believe in global warming and highly
educated Democrats tend to believe that climate change is due to human activity.
By contrast, Republicans tend to be skeptical about global warming and less
likely to believe that humans are responsible for climate change. He cites similar
partisan divides on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election—
Democrats tend to believe that the Russian government tried to interfere in the
election and Republicans much less so—and on immigration. 19 All of Professor
Hasen’s examples are about how partisanship affects decisions that are supposed
to be made on the merits or facts but that are instead made on the basis of partisan
identity or loyalty. 20
Based on his examples, Professor Hasen’s claim appears to be that our
political evaluations, instead of being based on the merits—whether they are true
or not—are instead biased by our partisan lens. 21 In the last few years, political
scientists have exhaustively documented the electorate’s partisan motivated
reasoning, which researchers have concluded is a consequence of
hyperpartisanship. 22 For issues that are politically salient, Americans generally
tend to filter their policy preferences or policy evaluations through their partisan
identities. Or as one political scientist noted, “partisans . . . bend reality to make
it fit their preconceptions.” 23 Social scientists have called this phenomenon
partisan motivated reasoning. 24 Citizens evaluate political issues through a
partisan lens. 25 Voters tend to discount negative information about co-partisans
and tend to believe negative information about people or leaders of the other

18. Id. at 538.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 538–39.
21. There is a fairly robust legal literature here. See e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E.
Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L. REV. 236 (2018); Justin
Levitt, Intent is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993
(2018); Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government
Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351 (2017); Heather K. Gerken, Commentary, Playing Cards in
a Hurricane; Party Reform in an Age of Polarization, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 911 (2017); Samuel
Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 415 (2004).
22. For a review of the literature, see Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21, at 261–66.
23. Martin Bisgaard, Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions, Attributions of Blame, and
Partisan-Motivated Reasoning During Crisis, 77 J. POL. 849, 849 (2015).
24. See, e.g., Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman, & Fay Lomax Cook, The Influence of
Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion, 36 POL. BEH. 235 (2014); Thomas J. Leeper &
Rune Slothuus, Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning and Public Opinion Formation, 35
ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 129 (2014).
25. See, e.g., Matthew J. Lebo & Daniel Cassino, The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated
Reasoning and the Dynamics of Partisan Presidential Approval, 28 POL. PSYCH. 719 (2017);
Martin Bisgaard, Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions, Attributions of Blame, and
Partisan-Motivated Reasoning During Crisis, 77 J. POL. 849 (2015).
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party. 26 Additionally, they tend to take their cues on issues based upon the
positions taken by leaders of their party. 27 As Professor Fuentes-Rohwer and I
stated in summarizing the literature:
the relevant inquiry is not: What do Americans think about particular issue?
Rather, the inquiry is: What do Republicans and Democrats think? Furthermore,
what the rank-and-file Republican or Democrat thinks about a particular public
policy issue is often strongly influenced if not determined, by the cues the rank
and file receive from partisan elites and how the issue has been framed by these
elites. 28

Thus, what Professor Hasen refers to as post-truth is best understood as partisan
motivated reasoning. 29
PROBLEM, SYMPTOM, AND CAUSATION
Professor Hasen argues that because we live in post-truth era, it is
“increasingly difficult for voters to separate true from false information relevant
to information campaigns.” 30 This epistemic difficulty is, presumably,
exacerbated by the deliberate attempts by partisans, candidates, and foreigners
to deliberately spread misinformation during an election campaign. He intimates
that in a post-truth era “voters on the losing end of a close election” will be less
likely to “trust vote totals and elections results announced by election officials
when voters are bombarded with conspiracy theories about the reliability of
voting technology and when foreign adversaries target voting systems to
undermine confidence.” 31 In view of this harm he asks whether “election law
provides an avenue for preventing the erosion of truth through misinformation
and synthetic media?” 32 His main suggestion is essentially a disclosure regime.
He proposes that campaign finance law compel individuals who are
disseminating misinformation to disclose their identity. 33 He also proposes that

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 21, at 264.
29. This literature is extensive and growing. For a sample of the recent literature, in addition
to the sources cited supra note 24 and 25, see LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW
POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY (2018); KEVIN ARCENEAUX & RYAN J. VANDER WIELEN,
TAMING INTUITION: HOW REFLECTION MINIMIZES PARTISAN REASONING AND PROMOTES
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2017); ERIK W. GROENENDYK, COMPETING MOTIVES IN THE
PARTISAN MIND: HOW LOYALTY AND RESPONSIVENESS SHAPE PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND
DEMOCRACY (2013); ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE POLARIZED PUBLIC?: WHY AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT IS SO DYSFUNCTIONAL (2013).
30. Hasen, supra note 1, at 536.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 537.
33. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

MOTIVATED REASONING, POST-TRUTH, AND ELECTION LAW

601

the government compel social media platforms “to label synthetic media
containing altered video and audio images as ‘altered.’” 34
Professor Hasen raises a number of important problems. He is right to focus
on the problem of misinformation, including intentional misinformation using
deep fakes and bots. Furthermore, I don’t quarrel with his concern that voters
who voted for a losing candidate may not accept the results of the election if the
election was close and if there were rumors about foreign interference or
allegations that voting machines are not reliable.
In this part, I raise some objections to Professor Hasens’ general claim about
misinformation. My main quarrel with Professor Hasen here is that, under the
rubric of misinformation, he treats as similar a number of election law problems
that are likely different, that probably have different causal origins, and more
than likely different solutions. The paper does not differentiate, for example,
between foreign interference in elections, intentional misinformation by
candidates, intentional misinformation by supporters of the candidates,
problems with voting machines, general misinformation, mistrust in election
results, and the like. Some of these issues, such as the problem with
misinformation in election law, is not new. Campaign finance law has long
struggled with the issue of misinformation and untruths. Some commentators
have advocated deregulation and more information. Others have advocated, like
Professor Hasen, disclosure and substantive regulations. These are perennial
debates in the field. And there is no reason to believe that courts are at an
epistemic disadvantage in resolving these types of problems.
Some issues, like foreign interference with elections, have absolutely
nothing to do with the courts. The problem there is Congress. Congress needs to
pass laws and take measures to secure American elections against foreign
attacks. Some issues, such as the reliability of voting machines or problems with
ballot design, are a function of the fact that American election administration is
extremely decentralized and has generally been—though this has changed and
is changing—insufficiently professionalized. There is no centralized mechanism
for resolving election administration disputes. Election administration might
differ from one local unit to another in the same county, much less the same
state, much less across states. There is no central entity that compels local
election officials toward professionalization and to adopt best practices in
election administration.
In addition, there is the very separate question of how partisan motivated
reasoning might affect election law disputes. Take two scenarios. In the first
scenario, which assumes a deeply polarized environment, candidates might be
more motivated to lie about their opponents, given the low cost of broadly
disseminating misinformation through social media and knowing that motivated
reasoning will make it more than likely that their supporters will believe in34. Id.
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group lies. In the second scenario, a losing candidate might urge her supporters
to refuse to accept the result of an election because of actual or perceived
irregularities in the voting process. These are two separate phenomena. Election
law and scholarship have generally believed that the answer to misinformation
and disinformation is more information and counter-information. More
information seems sensible—at least the burden is on someone arguing
otherwise—in the misinformation campaign depicted in the first scenario. But
more information might not be effective as a solution in the second scenario. If
there are legitimate worries about the integrity of voting machines or that there
were irregularities in the voting process, an unscrupulous loser might take
advantage of the perception of election maladministration to sow distrust in the
outcome. The solution here is not more information but to improve the
administration of elections. These are all separate inquiries and they should be
disentangled, not enmeshed together.
Professor Hasen is right to focus on the problem of the intentional
deployment of misinformation to influence electoral politics. But the intentional
deployment of misinformation to influence electoral politics is not new. It is not
a function of a “post-truth” world. Election law has long debated whether the
government can substantively prevent candidates from lying and intentional
misleading the voting public. 35 And election law has long debated whether
simple disclosure is enough to address the issue of misinformation. 36
Almost fifty-years ago, the New York State Board of Elections enacted a
Fair Campaign Code that, inter alia, prohibited attacks on a candidate based on
the candidate’s race, ethnicity, and religion and prohibited misrepresentations of
a candidate’s qualifications, misrepresentations of a candidate’s positions,
including “scurrilous attacks.” 37 Two plaintiffs filed suit against the board. One
of the plaintiff’s, Joseph Ferris, was a candidate for an Assembly seat. His
opponent, Vincent Riccio, reported Ferris to the Board because Ferris
misrepresented Viccio’s voting record.
A three-judge court had no qualms striking down the provisions of the
Board’s regulations that prohibited misrepresentations of candidate’s positions
and qualifications. That court noted: “Undoubtedly, deliberate calculated
falsehoods when used by political candidates can lead to public cynicism and
apathy toward the electoral process. However, when the State through the guise
of protecting the citizen’s right to a fair and honest election tampers with what
35. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 285, 285 (2004).
36. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A
Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. F. 892, 892–93 (1984). For a discussion of
these issues outside of the election law context see Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, The New
Fighting Words?: How U.S. Law Hampers the Fight Against Information Warfare, 22 U. PA. J.
CON. L. 81, 170 (2019).
37. See Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 87 (E.D.N.Y 1976).
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it will permit the citizen to see and hear even that important state interest must
give way to the irresistible force of protected expression under the First
Amendment.” 38 The court exclaimed, “deliberate false statement[s] [are]
constitutionally protected when uttered during the course of a political
campaign.” 39
Almost twenty-five years ago, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 40
the United States Supreme Court struck down an Ohio statute that prohibited
individuals from distributing anonymous campaign literature. The Ohio
Supreme Court had upheld the ordinance on the ground that it made it easier to
identify individuals who disseminated false statements. 41 The Court stated that
the Ohio statute regulates core political speech. The Court conceded that state’s
interest in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements have weight and they
are particular weight in the context of an election campaign, “when false
statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at
large.” 42 However, the Court concluded that Ohio regulates fraud directly and
requiring individual’s to disclose their identity “is not the state’s principal
weapon against fraud.” 43 Consequently, the Court concluded that the statute was
overbroad. 44
As these cases show, states, New York in Vanasco and Ohio in McIntyre,
and courts have wrestled with the issue of false information and misinformation
in political campaigns. These are the some of the fundamental questions in the
domain of campaign speech. As my co-author James Gardner and I remarked in
our election law casebook: “As a normative matter, if political information is
critical to the electorate’s choice, shouldn’t the information be truthful? What is
the best method of producing truthful information so that voters can make an
informed choice?” 45 These are difficult questions with no easy answers, but they
are not new questions. And judges have been wrestling with these questions
thoughtfully for decades.
REGULATING MISINFORMATION?
I do not disagree with Professor Hasen that the use of technology and social
media by candidates, individuals, or other entities to intentionally spread
misinformation in the course of an electoral campaign raises epistemic worries.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 91.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 351.
See JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 634 (2d ed. 2018).
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The real question is whether law—federal or state statutes or constitutional
doctrine—can do much about the problem. I address that difficulty in this part.
Professor Hasen seems to be particularly concerned with the use of social
media to create misinformation and with two types of modern vehicles that
appear to be tailor-made to spread misinformation: deep fakes and bots. 46 He
provides two main examples. In the first example, we are basically to imagine a
scenario in which the news about Donald Trump’s Access Hollywood tape,
which surfaced one month before the 2016 presidential election campaign, was
fictional. In the so-called Access Hollywood tapes, Trump was recorded
bragging in offensive terms about the methods he uses to have sex with women,
which basically amounted to physical and sexual assault. 47
His worry here is that politicians and political activists will use deep fakes
to spread misinformation. He defines deep fakes as “audio and video clips
manipulated using machine learning and artificial intelligence that can make a
politician, celebrity, or anyone else appear to say or do anything the manipulator
wants.” 48 He predicts, “[a]s technology improves, it is quickly getting easier
even for those without great technical sophistication to use artificial technology
to create” deep fakes. 49 Thus, “[w]ithin a few years, any politician could be made
to appear to say the odious words on the ‘Access Hollywood’ tape, and that
content could spread virally via Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. We
will no longer be able to trust what we see and hear.” 50
Professor Hasen intimates that the only way to truly address the
consequences of deliberate misinformation that uses deep fakes is for Congress
to regulate it. 51 Though he concedes that “there are limits to how much law can
help to solve these problems with our democracy,” this concession is
pragmatic. 52 He recognizes that the Supreme Court would more than likely apply
heightened scrutiny to laws regulating the substantive content of speech. 53 His
normative preference seems to be in favor of substantive regulation. He thus
argues, “[c]ourts should recognize that the government has a compelling interest
in assuring voters have access to truthful political information and the tools to
discover truth or falsity.” 54 Notwithstanding this language, Professor Hasen is

46. Hasen, supra note 1, at 542–54.
47. David A. Farenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-re
corded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce776-8cb4-1
1e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.13108edfa3b6 [https://perma.cc/W2RP-TQTQ].
48. Hasen, supra note 1, at 542.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 542–43.
51. Id. at 545.
52. Id.
53. Hasen, supra note 1, at 545.
54. Id.
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less than clear as to whether he is making a descriptive claim here—that under
current doctrine, Congress could pass a law prohibiting the use of technology to
intentionally misinform the electorate for the purposes of influencing an election
and therefore should do so—or whether he is making a normative claim—that
Congress ought to have the power to regulate deep fakes. He concedes that
substantive regulation of deep fakes would be difficult under current doctrine
while at the same time noting that the constitutional barrier would not be
insuperable.
Professor Hasen offers three potential solutions to this problem but none
effectively addresses the problem he sets out to address. First, he argues that “the
government could prohibit. . . false speech about the mechanics of voting.” 55 He
is certainly right that the government can do so and the government can provide
true speech about the mechanics of voting, as could institutions that voters
trust—their (not the other side’s) candidates, political parties, civic
organizations. This is all true. But this is not the problem that Professor Hasen
identified. He did not identify misinformation about the mechanics of voting. He
hypothesized deep fakes about a candidate’s character (or issue position) by that
candidate’s political opponents.
Second, Professor Hasen states, “nothing would prevent a government
agency from declaring what is true or false about elections, politics, or policy,
and then voters could take that information for what it is worth: a credible
government agency is likely to be believed, while an agency headed by a
charlatan yelling ‘fake news’ would be less likely to be believed.” 56 First,
partisan motivated reasoning can affect whether voters believe a government
agency is credible or believable on policy or politics. 57 Second, as I noted with
Professor Hasen’s first argument, the problem identified by Professor Hasen is
not about elections, politics, or policy. The problem is misinformation by
political contenders in the course of an electoral campaign. Consequently, this
solution in inapposite.
Third, Professor Hasen argues, “the government likely has the power under
the Constitution to mandate a truth-in-labeling law requiring social media
platforms and other websites with large numbers of users to deploy the best
reasonably available technology to label synthetic media containing altered
video and audio images as ‘altered.’” 58 I am less confident than Professor Hasen
that the government can compel communications platforms to determine
whether a third party’s communication is authentic and then to label that speech

55. Id. at 548.
56. Id. at 549.
57. For a classic treatment, see Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in
Political Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAVIOR 117 (2002). See also Alan S. Gerber & Gregory A.
Huber, Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessment, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI 153 (2010).
58. Hasen, supra note 1, at 549.
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as unauthentic. I think such a requirement would run headlong into the Court’s
compelled speech cases. 59 Professor Hasen seeks refuge in judicial opinions
stating that heightened scrutiny may not apply to compelled speech. 60 He
concludes, incredibly, that compelled speech of deep fakes about politics and
policy is compelled “disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial
information in a commercial context.” 61 It seems to me that deep fakes about
politics and policy are core political and not commercial speech. 62 Moreover, if
the problem is disputes about policy and politics, it is not clear why more speech
by campaigns and independent fact-checkers is not sufficiently effective to
respond to the problem of misinformation. 63
Professor Hasen’s second example is the 2017 Alabama Senate race
between the Republican nominee Roy Moore and the Democratic nominee and
the eventual winner of that race Doug Jones. 64 Supporters of Doug Jones,
unbeknownst to him, created a social media campaign on both Facebook and
Twitter falsely associating Mr. Moore with a campaign to ban alcohol. 65 The
Facebook and Twitter pages purported to be from religious supporters of Mr.
Moore. 66 These supporters of Mr. Jones were attempting to undermine Mr.
Moore’s campaign by attempting to link Mr. Moore with an unpopular cause. 67
The misinformation campaign also tried to emphasize a link between Mr. Moore
and underage girls and tried to create the, false, impression that Mr. Moore’s
campaign was supported by Russians. 68 Mr. Moore’s opponents created
thousands of purported Russian bots that were following Mr. Moore’s twitter
account. 69
Perhaps surprisingly, Professor Hasen’s objection to the manner in which
individuals, partisans, or foreigners might use social media and bots to spread

59. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking down a
compelled disclosure requirement); Pac. Gas & Electric v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S.
1 (1986) (striking down regulation forbidding company from putting its own political statements
on the billing statements that it sends to its customers).
60. Hasen, supra note 1, at 551.
61. Id.
62. In any event, the Court stated in Riley that commercial speech does not “retain[] its
commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
63. Amanda L. Wintersieck, Debating the Truth: The Impact of Fact-Checking During
Electoral Debates, 45 AM. POL. RES. 304 (2017).
64. Hasen, supra note 1, at 554.
65. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama Senate Race Imitated Russian
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senate-roy
-jones-russia.html [https://perma.cc/8WNA-LHXW].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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misinformation is not necessarily with the misinformation itself but with the fact
that voters are unaware of the true identity of the individual or entity responsible
for the misinformation. As he observed with respect to misinformation campaign
in the Jones-Moore race, “information about the source of the influence
campaign was not available to voters when they voted.” 70 The information
“came to light only after the election through leaks to the New York Times and
Washington Post.” 71 He argues that “Congress should extend the same rules that
apply to television and radio advertisements to advertising distributed online,
including via social media.” 72 More specifically, he proposes that “modern
campaign finance disclosure law should be updated so that it requires disclosure
of the funders behind coordinated and well-funded attempts to influence
elections via social media, even if the attempted persuasion comes in the form
of bot-generated private messages lacking express advocacy.” 73
This is where it is important to accurately characterize the problem.
Disclosure might be useful here. But it might not. Without accounting for
partisan motivated reasoning, we cannot fully assess the sufficiency of the
solution. The literature on partisan motivated reasoning tells us that voters pay
attention to information that affirms their priors, confirmation bias. And they
also filter information in a manner that is consistent with their partisan frames.
So, disclosure might worsen as opposed to alleviate the propensity of voters to
make decisions on the basis of their partisan identities and not on the basis of
the facts. To assess the relevance of the solution, we need a better sense of the
problem.
CONCLUSION
One possibility is that deep fakes present a problem that is an order of
magnitude different from the traditional misinformation problems that has been
the staple of election law disputes. So far, though this may change, the evidence
does not yet support that conclusion. In an editorial reporting the findings of an
empirical study that he conducted with his co-authors on the effects of false and
misleading information published on the internet and on Facebook, Professor
Brendan Nyhan states:
[M]any of the initial conclusions that observers reached about the scope of fake
news consumption, and its effects on our politics, were exaggerated or incorrect.
Relatively few people consumed this form of content directly during the 2016
campaign, and even fewer did so before the 2018 election. Fake news
consumption is concentrated among a narrow subset of Americans with the most

70.
71.
72.
73.

Hasen, supra note 1, at 555.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 559.
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conservative news diets. And, most notably, no credible evidence exists that
exposure to fake news changed the outcome of the 2016 election. 74

Additionally, in a separate study, Professor Nyhan and his co-authors concluded:
The role of Facebook in the spread of fake news appears to have changed. In
2016, the site differentially appeared in web traffic just before visits to fake news
sites, suggesting it played a key role in enabling the spread of fake news. No
such pattern is apparent in the 2018 data. This result, which echoes findings from
other studies and holds with an updated set of websites we compiled before the
2018 study, suggests that the platform’s efforts to limit the reach of fake news
are having some impact. 75

From the available evidence so far, deliberate misinformation through deep
fakes has not yet had an impact on our society and it seems that the content
providers are being attentive to the problem. That may change. This is an
empirical question and we ought to keep our eye on how things are working on
the ground.
I don’t have a quarrel with Professor Hasen’s point that modern campaign
finance law and literature needs to think more deeply about how social media
and technology should be included within the regulatory framework. I don’t
have a view on that point, but I think it is one that ought to be taken seriously. I
do, however, object to the post-truth frame. Partisan motivated reasoning
significantly tests our assumptions that voters make information about politics
and policy based upon real world facts. That issue is significant enough and we
ought to be paying more attention to it. Talking about post-truth undermines our
ability to assess the problem correctly.

74. Brendan Nyhan, Why Fears of Fake News are Overhyped, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/11/why-fears-of-fake-news-are-overhyped.html [https://perma.cc/
GR8B-DEMH].
75. Id.

